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ASSESSING THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STR ATEGY
A Window into Chinese Thinking
Andrew S. Erickson

T

he new U.S. maritime strategy embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the nation can best pursue its interests in harmony
with those of other states. In light of the strategy’s focus on building partnerships to better safeguard the global maritime commons, it is vital that American
leaders clearly understand the frank and unvarnished views of allies, friends,
and potential partners. The strategy’s unveiling at the Naval War College on 17
October 2007 with the leaders of nearly a hundred navies and coast guards present demonstrated initial global maritime inclusiveness. The new maritime strategy is generating responses from numerous states. As
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the potential to play a major role as well. How the United States can maintain its
existing status and role while China continues to rise—as the world’s greatest
developed and developing powers attempt to reach an understanding that might
be termed “competitive coexistence”—will be perhaps the critical question in
international relations for the twenty-first century.1 To that end, this study analyzes three of the most significant unofficial Chinese assessments of the maritime strategy publicly available to date and offers annotated full-length translations (which follow, in the form of essays) so that a foreign audience can survey
the documents themselves.2
A PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a long tradition of informing its policy elites on international affairs through the widespread translation of foreign
news and documents.
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership (1949–76), official discourse was dominated
by “doctrinalism.”3 Revolutionary leaders dedicated to “antagonistic contradictions and struggle” used ambiguous ideological statements to mobilize political
factions and launch personal attacks against their rivals. By the late 1970s, however, Deng Xiaoping had shifted the national emphasis to economic and science
and technology development, called for pragmatic debate of policy issues and
solutions, and thereby opened the way for market forces and more widespread
circulation of information.4
These factors have allowed a “public intellectual complex” to emerge
under Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Members of this community of strategic scholars and policy makers at a wide variety of private and
public institutions engage in increasingly vigorous debates, publish widely
in specialized and popular journals, make media appearances, and on occasion brief policy makers and even China’s senior leadership. Some intellectuals are privy to internal deliberations, and a few play a major role in shaping policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. Even when Chinese
public intellectuals are not directly involved in the policy process, their views
often matter. Their ideas may inform policy makers indirectly and even be
adopted as policy. They may also play a role in justifying or socializing alreadyestablished policies.5 When politics or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to
the fore, public intellectuals may become caught up in a larger competition
of ideas. For all these reasons, their writings are worth examining for possible
insights into Chinese policy debates and even, possibly, government decision
making. Chinese analysts are meticulous students of policy documents from
major countries (particularly the United States), and they scrutinize their texts
in the belief that wording contains specific insights; any significant U.S. policy
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document (e.g., the maritime strategy) is therefore likely to receive careful vetting in Chinese publications.6
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the maritime strategy has been
subject to Chinese description and evaluation. In the first year since the strategy’s promulgation, it was covered extensively in China’s civilian (and, to a lesser
extent, military) press. The vast majority of these articles, however, were brief
and descriptive.7 Some of the more extensive ones touched on the strategy indirectly in discussing more broadly U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific; 8
a few were rather sensational in their obsession with the idea that the United
States is attempting to “contain” China.9
这是美军海上战略可能发生的重大变化, 应该得到世界各国的肯定.
This could be a major change in the U.S. military’s maritime strategy. It must receive the affirmation
of all the world’s nations.
Thus far, three openly published articles stand out from the rest in their focus
on the strategy, the detail and sophistication of their analyses, and their having
been written by recognized experts from major institutions; they have therefore
been selected as the focus of this study. Their respective authors’ affi liations
suggest that their writings (in terms of variations in coverage) offer windows
into how different elements of China’s bureaucracy, with their specific interests
and perspectives, assess the new U.S. maritime strategy. While these informed
commentaries are not definitive and should not be overinterpreted, they may be
suggestive of the Chinese government’s viewpoint and future policy responses.
The first article is by Lu Rude, emeritus professor at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy.10 Lu has been a consistent proponent of maritime and naval development and contributes frequently to debates on China’s naval priorities.11
Lu enlisted in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in 1951, beginning
a military career that would last for half a century, of which over four decades
would be devoted to education in maritime navigation.12 Lu’s full-page article
on the new maritime strategy appeared in People’s Navy, the official newspaper
of the PLAN, which is published by the service’s Political Department and provides guidance for officers and enlisted personnel.13 Lu outlines the new U.S.
maritime strategy’s context, content, and implications for international security,
particularly in East Asia. He lauds the strategy’s emphasis on confl ict prevention
and international cooperation but places the onus on the United States to demonstrate its strategic sincerity through concrete actions. He highlights the document’s emphasis on multinational cooperation against unconventional threats
but also draws attention to the Navy’s stated mission of “deterring potential
competitors.”
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The second article is by Wang Baofu, researcher and deputy director of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University’s Institute for
Strategic Studies.14 Wang’s comments and assessments on international relations and arms control appear frequently in China’s official media, as well as
in popular media and academic publications.15 His present article appeared in
Study Times, a journal of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School.
An outspoken critic of the American intervention in Iraq, Wang sees the new
maritime strategy as the outgrowth of a comprehensive reassessment of U.S.
military policy, methods, and objectives in the aftermath of both 9/11 and the
early phases of the Iraq war.16
The third article is by Su Hao, a well published professor in the Department
of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University and director of its Center for Asia-Pacific Studies.17 He is also a board member in a range of Chinese
organizations that focus on security, cooperation, and bilateral exchange.18 Su
has emphasized that Chinese national interests and identity are primarily continental.19 He displays a deep understanding of the strategy’s wording, having also
published a full-length Chinese translation.20 Su’s article appeared in Leaders,
a popular magazine on current affairs and policy published in Hong Kong for
domestic consumption there, as well as for a select mainland audience.
COMMON ASSESSMENTS
The three articles give a sophisticated and relatively comprehensive summary of
the U.S. maritime strategy. They differ in assessing various aspects of the document, and there is some tension between the commonalities that emerge from
shared perspectives and those that are products of the articles’ having followed
the strategy’s original structure. But the three articles unambiguously share several major conclusions.
A New Strategic Direction. All three authors see the new U.S. maritime strategy
as representing a major shift from the Maritime Strategy of 1986. Each regards
the strategies issued in the interim as products of post–Cold War strategic uncertainties, with little lasting influence.21 They characterize the current strategy
as fundamentally different. Su explains that when formulating the 2007 edition,
“U.S. Navy theoretical circles were faced with the new situation of international
antiterrorism and the rapid rise of emerging countries.” Wang states that the
new strategy “not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime
security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use
military power to meet national security objectives.” All emphasize the importance of the subject at hand: in Wang’s words, “As a bellwether of world military
transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits scrutiny.”
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Emphasis on Cooperation and Conflict Prevention. All three analysts praise the
strategy’s explicit focus on cooperation. Su declares that “it prominently emphasizes maritime security cooperation.” Wang states that “the U.S. military’s ‘maritime strategy’ has already taken ‘international cooperation’ as an important principle. This . . . indicates that the United States security and military strategy will
face a major new adjustment.” Lu writes, “One can see that the new U.S. maritime
strategy emphasizes ‘military software’ such as ‘humanitarian rescue missions and
improving cooperative relations between the United States and every country.’”
The analysts all emphasize that the new maritime strategy elevates preventing war to an equal status with winning wars. They interpret war prevention as
involving primarily soft-power operations, as opposed to deterrence based on
war-winning capabilities to undergird otherwise cooperative approaches. Wang
有一个引人注目的新观点: 明确写入 “防止战争与赢得战争同等重要” 的观点.
There is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing and Winning
War Are Equally Important.”
terms the emphasis on war prevention the strategy’s “most prominent feature.”
Lu describes this “conspicuous new viewpoint” as a product of “major change”
and recognizes the utility of “maritime military operations other than war” and
increased “international cooperation and noncombat use of navies,” to include
humanitarian rescue missions and improved cooperative relations with other
regions. Su describes this as a “major bright spot.” Chinese analysts implicitly
welcome a U.S. Navy more focused on such missions than on sea control and
power projection.
But the Chinese analysts are not prepared to acknowledge fully that war
prevention may require substantial coercive capabilities. (Wang does mention
“strategic deterrence theory,” and Su notes that the strategy, in its own words,
“does not assume conflict, but also recognizes the historical reality that peace
cannot be automatically maintained”). They are examining regional maritime
security from the perspective of China’s national interests. These include emphasizing the use of venues in which Beijing is relatively influential (e.g., the
United Nations) to address disputes and limit foreign military influence. In the
views of many Chinese, letting other states unduly shape these areas could—in a
worst-case scenario—lead to military intervention in a manner that could harm
China’s regional influence and sovereignty claims.22 In the analysts’ apparent
unwillingness to acknowledge that conflict prevention can sometimes rely on
coercive capabilities, one can see an effort to emphasize desired elements of
the document while deemphasizing or contesting undesired ones—a common
practice in both policy analysis and international relations around the world.
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Mention of Multipolarity. The analysts also note the maritime strategy’s reference to a “multipolar” world. Lu describes this as a “first time” shift in U.S.
policy documents. In the translator’s opinion, however, the term “multipolar”
describes neither the international system as it currently exists nor the world
that U.S. policy makers would want in the future.23 Moreover, many Chinese
audiences regard “multipolar” (多极) as having a specific meaning: “a world in
which there are several major regional powers and no single superpower hegemon.” This situation would be realized in the near future only by substantial
relative decline in U.S. power, to the benefit of other emerging major powers.
A small but increasingly influential Chinese school of thought promoting an
American “decline theory” (衰落论)—which lost influence after it incorrectly
predicted the emergence of multipolarity immediately following the Cold War’s
end—has recently gained ground with the U.S. difficulties in Iraq and elsewhere.24 China’s 2006 defense white paper states that “the world is at a critical
stage, moving toward multi-polarity.”25 The strategy’s very use of the term “multipolar,” therefore, appears to validate the Chinese government’s vision of the
potential benefits of a decline in American hegemony, which it views as a threat
to its core interests.26 To be sure, the authors surveyed clearly believe that the
United States is still hegemonic and thus retains significant deterrence power.27
But in the translator’s view, while arrogance will only further erode American
influence, actively encouraging the perception that American power is ebbing
risks undermining deterrence capabilities in the longer term.
Together with other apparent instances of recognition by the United States of
the limitations of its power and influence, the translator believes, such a change
of attitude is likely to be seen by many Chinese as inspired not by sudden enlightenment in an altruistic sense but rather by growing recognition of weakness
(in light of previously overambitious strategic goals). Indeed, the analysts cited
here seem to welcome, as Su points out in almost Corbettian fashion, a strategy
apparently based on recognition of limitations (U.S. “ability is not equal to its
ambition”) and a consequent reliance on cooperation with other international
partners. As Su states, paraphrasing the strategy itself (as do Lu and Wang), “no
country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security of the entire maritime area.” In the translator’s opinion, then, the problematic use of the term
“multipolar” thus potentially risks causing misinterpretation, miscalculation,
and false expectation on the part of Chinese analysts—or perhaps even worse,
making the strategy’s rhetoric seem removed from the reality of U.S. force structure and deployments. Care should be taken in further interactions with Chinese counterparts to counteract potential misperceptions in this regard.
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Appreciation of Domestic Dimensions. The analysts also recognize the interagency aspects of U.S. maritime cooperation and coordination. As Su notes, this
is the “first time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report,” which
“makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three maritime forces.”
He notes the strategy’s injunction “that coordination and cooperation must be
strengthened among the maritime forces of each military service and each domestic department.” This seems to indicate recognition that cooperation and
coordination among the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will be particularly important to the strategy’s successful functioning. Wang’s analysis, as
will be discussed in more detail below, displays significant understanding of the
U.S. defense policy process.
在美国官方正式的文体中首次提出了多极化转化, 建设海上共同利益的 “合作伙伴.”
This is the first time that U.S. official writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition to
multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on maritime common
interests.
A Special Role for Naval Forces. The analysts see the maritime domain as vital
to many nations’ development and recognize the central role that the U.S. Navy
has played in the world. Wang contends that “the ability of the United States
to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . comprehension of
sea power, and [its] emphasis on maritime force development.” All three note
that today “the majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred
kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a direct bearing on the American
people’s way of life.” Lu additionally observes (using wording similar to that of
Wang) that naval forces are particularly relevant to fighting terrorism, because
of such “special characteristics” as “mobility, which gives [them] the ability to
advance and withdraw, to deter and fight.”
Asia-Pacific Focus. All three scholars identify the Asia-Pacific as a priority area
for American naval presence. Lu describes the Middle East as a “powder keg”
and acknowledges the status of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea—the two
other areas specifically mentioned in the strategy—as strategic energy lifelines.
But he uses his own interpretation to connect several issues mentioned separately in the strategy, concluding that “the Western Pacific is determined to be
‘a region of high tension’ where the United States has the responsibility to ‘carry
out treaty obligations’ to its allies and to ‘contain potential strategic competitors.’” Wang and Su also take notice of the maritime strategy’s specific mention
of the western Pacific.
Continued Hegemony. Perhaps most important, all three analysts view the
strategy as part of a larger U.S. effort to maintain its predominant international
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power and capabilities for unilateral action. They do acknowledge that the new
strategy is far more cooperative than the 1986 version in both concept and rhetoric. Wang states that “overbearing, offensive language is relatively reduced, and
there is noticeably more emphasis on ‘strategic cooperation.’” Lu notes that “the
new maritime strategy is relatively moderate compared to the previous version
in its use of words and style.” But, he emphasizes, while the strategy “projects
the pleasant wording of ‘peace,’ ‘cooperation,’ and ‘war prevention,’ hegemonic
thinking remains its main thread.” The analysts see the United States as unwilling
to abandon the traditional “hegemony” and “sea control” that its capabilities
have long afforded it. Wang judges that the United States retains a long-standing
“maritime hegemonic mentality,” which he traces to Mahanian thought, and
that the nation remains “the only superpower in the world today.” He adds:
“Because the United States . . . places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than
safeguarding the world maritime order.” Lu charges that “the hegemonic U.S.
thinking of dominating the world’s oceans has not changed at all.” In his view,
“what is behind ‘cooperation’ is America’s interests[;] having ‘partners or the
participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.”
The Chinese analysts here are expressing concern that the United States retains power to threaten core Chinese interests. These interests include reunification with Taiwan, assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands (and associated
resources, as well as air and water space) on China’s maritime periphery, and
ultimately some form of sea-lane security and regional maritime influence. Chinese concerns in this area offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of
U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the near term.
DIVERGING VIEWPOINTS
Despite these shared viewpoints, there are identifiable differences in focus and
interpretation among the three analysts. By chance, the maritime strategy’s
promulgation has coincided with a vigorous and unprecedented debate within
China concerning its own maritime development. The three Chinese assessments of the U.S. strategy, particularly in their judgments about the contours
and directions of American strategy, cannot help but influence that debate.
A Model for PLAN Development?
Lu’s lengthy, complex analysis contains apparent attempts to use the new maritime strategy, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of an elevated position of influence
for the U.S. Navy. Lu writes that the new maritime strategy of the United States
demonstrates that its Navy “has been placed in an extremely prominent position” and “continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S.
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global strategy.” While the latter point may seem optimistic to some, this formulation does describe realistically the character of U.S. power projection from
Lu’s strategic vantage point in maritime East Asia. Even with its current fiscal
difficulties, the U.S. Navy, in terms of capabilities alone, must seem very impressive to the PLAN. Such a portrayal of American naval power and influence
is consistent with Lu’s longtime advocacy of rapid, robust Chinese maritime
development.
There are several indications that his evaluation, in addition to educating
PLAN officers about the U.S. maritime strategy, may also contain an implicit ar. . .如此构想, 不能不说是在单边主义和先发制人战略遭受挫折之后, 对运用军事手段
实现国家利益认识上的重大变化.
This new concept . . . can only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following
setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.
gument for a similar increase in the PLAN’s mission from access denial to bluewater defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as consistent with China’s
growing interests as a great power.28 More than Su or even Wang, Lu appears to
believe that “the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry.” He notes that
“the Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among nations for
maritime sovereignty,” that it “has the highest concentration and fastest growth
in terms of the world’s naval forces,” and that it “is the sea area where the U.S.
military conducts the largest and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies.” Lu appears also to hint that PLAN development must inevitably be used
to balance against American naval power projection. “Some Asian countries are
rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess
nuclear weapons,” he notes elliptically; “they will directly influence and challenge American hegemony.”
Here Lu may be arguing implicitly for some form of PLAN power-projection
capability, perhaps in the form of deck aviation (as might be broadly surmised
from the context). In East Asia, he emphasizes, the United States “dispatches
carrier battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness.”
Were it operationally feasible, one might infer, China could benefit from similar capabilities to protect its sovereignty claims. Also, “by setting up pointed
defenses and carrying out strategic deployment, the United States is prepared
to act at any time and to intervene” in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean,
where China has similar interests in SLOC security and energy access.
In time, at least by Lu’s ambitious standards, China might likewise benefit
from a navy that could maximize its forward presence while minimizing its international footprint to avoid the tremendous political risk of overseas bases—
which the PRC has foresworn since its founding in 1949. This would seem to
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allow for a Chinese approach to power projection: respecting sovereignty while
influencing events ashore. Wang and Su do not appear to share Lu’s emphasis or
advocacy. But Lu’s arguments should not be dismissed as mere naval promotion.
While likely reflecting the PLAN’s bureaucratic interests, naval advocates like Lu
publishing in official forums must defer to the guidance promulgated by China’s
civilian leadership. The real danger here is that if Chinese naval development
were to be inspired by that of the United States, as would be manifest in internal
bureaucratic debates and budgetary battles, there would be a risk of the sort of
interaction effects that have triggered arms races.29
Seeking Explanations in Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics
Wang describes the new maritime strategy as not only representing a major departure from the tone of previous security documents issued by the George W.
Bush administration but as “one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last
twenty years.” He sees it as the logical outcome of three major factors: military
reversals in Iraq, the failures of transformation in that conflict, and the need for
the Navy to justify its share of the defense budget. “The ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks
produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept,” Wang observes, in
wording akin to Lu’s; “the U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly.” The Iraq
war experience, Wang states, is teaching America the importance of combining
hard and soft power to develop “rational strength.” This strategic rethinking,
and the concepts of the “thousand-ship navy” and Global Fleet Stations, “can
only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of
the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following
setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.”30 According to Wang,
“As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral Michael] Mullen repeatedly suggested
that ‘the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime
strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only
control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other
countries to maintain freedom of passage.’ It is precisely through his promotion
that the new ‘maritime strategy’ was introduced.”
Wang’s charge of strategic overreach is broadly compatible with Su’s less abrasive assessment, but it stands in contrast to Lu’s, which focuses more on U.S. capabilities than limitations. Wang’s third conclusion is based on a sophisticated
understanding of the American defense establishment and its policy processes:
“For the maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending
pie, they must lead strategic thinking and initiatives,” Wang maintains. At the
same time, like many of his peers, he also alleges that “some people and military
industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a ‘Chinese
naval threat theory.’”
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Strategic Coherence
Su’s largely descriptive article contains a fairly favorable assessment of U.S. maritime power and intentions. Su sees the United States as developing a coherent
maritime policy in which the maritime strategy and “the so-called ‘Thousand
Ship Navy’ concept currently being deliberated in U.S. Navy circles are two sides
of the same coin.” He relates that at a 2007 Naval War College conference, “Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with China,” at which he presented an
academic paper, “prospects for cooperation were optimistically forecast.” This
尽管美军新的 “海上战略” 阐述了 “国际合作” 的重要性, 但并没有使其完全放
弃海上霸权思维.
Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the importance of “international cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hegemonic mentality.
“atmosphere,” Su concludes, “is consistent with” the maritime strategy “and
reflects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with
China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United
States.” Where Lu sees a model for PLAN development and Wang sees responses
within the U.S. military bureaucracy to changing conditions and failed policies,
Su sees a carefully calibrated and coordinated diplomatic message.
ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED
For all their insights, the three analysts display limited understanding of the
bureaucratic context behind the strategy’s development. They collectively fail to
recognize (at least in print) that the new U.S. maritime strategy is not a standalone document, even in the American domestic bureaucratic context. While
they offer interpretations of the historical background and strategic circumstances of its formulation, they do not mention that the new strategy was guided
by the objectives set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Strategy for Maritime Security.31
Moreover, a number of key uncertainties are neither mentioned nor investigated by the analysts. U.S. Navy modernization goals would have seemed
another potential subject for inquiry, especially as the U.S. Navy appears fi rst
(in 2005) to have derived a goal of increasing its 281-ship fleet to 313 vessels by
2020, and then to have developed a strategy for their use. 32 These ambiguities
in the relationship between the ends and means of American policy are not
explored.
The maritime strategy was issued late in the second Bush administration,
yet the analysts seem to assume that it will serve as a precursor of future policy
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regardless of subsequent changes in U.S. government leadership. The strategy seems to be portrayed more as authoritative policy than as a “trial balloon,” yet these analysts give few indications as to how they believe it will
actually shape U.S. policy. Most American analysts, by contrast, believe that
the specific effects of the document on future U.S. maritime policy are not
yet certain. 33 Within the Navy, continued support by the Chief of Naval
Operations and the appearance of the maritime strategy’s principles in key
service planning documents (as well as national strategy pillar documents)
will provide important barometers of success. 34 None of these documents are
mentioned directly by the Chinese analysts. 35
As in the past, reactions from other military services, Congress, and the media will signal policy and monetary support for relevant programs. Wang appears to allude to this when he states that a major rethinking of military and
foreign policy remains under way: “The U.S. intellectual elite is in the process of
comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact on
policy-making departments.” Implementation of the new strategy is certain to be
subject to budgetary limitations, particularly given the ongoing challenges associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From Wang’s perspective, by contrast, “whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party comes to power,
adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign policy are inevitable.”
Wang and Su seem to appreciate the fiscal challenges that may impact American
military spending. None of the analysts appear to entertain the idea, however,
that funding constraints might limit the development of nontraditional low-end
capabilities to support the maritime strategy.
Are the Chinese analysts “mirror imaging,” assuming that the strategy is a
more authoritative document than it may actually be on the basis of their own
experience with a more centralized policy process? Might their view reflect a superficial understanding of some aspects of the U.S. policy process? Perhaps. But
just as the strategy cannot be expected to address all possible issues or contingencies in detail—this would take too much space and risk its soon becoming
outdated—the three analysts cannot be expected to address all of its contents
and related issues. All three emphasize, however, a most important point, that a
broad acceptance of and participation in the Global Maritime Partnership initiative by the international community will be essential if the strategy is to fulfill its
intended goals. Nevertheless, these collective omissions suggest that the analyses
represent a “first cut” at understanding the strategy and how it may affect China.
The objective seems to be to consider some initial implications for maritime development in the United States and China, as well as the prospects for future
bilateral relations.
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TRUE TO ITS WORDS AND RESOLUTE IN ITS DEEDS
The Chinese analysts obviously have major concerns regarding the intentions
behind U.S. military strategy. With respect to the maritime strategy in particular,
they worry that beneath a veneer of cooperative rhetoric, they are being asked
to tolerate, or even directly acquiesce in, projection of U.S. power in a manner
全世界人民乐见其战略思维的改变, 更拭目以待, 企盼其真正行动, 取得实际效果.
The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will
wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.
that they believe threatens China’s core national interests. Here the cooperative
implications of the strategy may run against the grain of much Chinese thinking
regarding the United States, particularly its armed forces.
At the same time, the Chinese analysts are heartened by the new American emphasis on cooperation. While retaining concerns about U.S. strategic objectives,
they do not dismiss the strategy outright. For Lu, Washington stands at a strategic
crossroads, at which it must demonstrate its true strategic intentions to Beijing.
On one hand, Lu is concerned about the frequent “transnational and multinational maritime military exercises” in East Asia that, he believes, constitute “evidence
that the new U.S. maritime strategy has already been put into effect.” On the other
hand, the new cooperative approach may truly represent “a major change in the
U.S. military’s maritime strategy,” Lu allows. “It must receive the affirmation of
all the world’s nations.”
The election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in March 2008 has placed
cross-Strait relations on an improved trajectory after eight years of instability
under Chen Shui-bian. Meanwhile, recent developments suggest that PLAN
missions may become increasingly compatible with the maritime strategy’s
focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At an expanded Central
Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman Hu Jintao
introduced a new military policy that defines the four new missions of the PLA,
one of them being to “play an important role in maintaining world peace and
promoting common development.”36 PLAN writings are operationalizing both
this theme and Hu’s recent guidance that China’s military should pay attention
to “diversified military tasks” (多样化任务).37 Such factors may well support
mission convergence and increase strategic space for Sino-American maritime
cooperation, though it will take substantial effort from both sides to exploit opportunities, and it will not be easy.
Chinese analysts will therefore likely watch the concrete actions on the part
of the United States to see how they affect Beijing’s core strategic concerns. In
future discussions with their American counterparts, they will probably continue to probe for U.S. willingness to commit to actions that would make China
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feel strategically more assured. They will undoubtedly be looking for the United
States to, in the words of a Chinese proverb, “言必信, 行必果”—to be true to its
words and resolute in its deeds. As Lu puts it, “The people of the entire world
are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and see,
hoping for genuine actions and practical results.”
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